We examined the environmental risks associated with existing and planned new coal power plants of China's top 50 coal power groups, which together account for 89 per cent of the country's total installed capacity.We measured the exposure of each plant to risk assumptions at 7 regional levels and 12 country levels.This asset-level analysis is then aggregated to the parent company level to help specific investors make investment decisions including risk management, risk screening, voting, participation and withdrawal.We also target China's five major power generation groups (huaneng international, datangjiGroup, guodian group, huadian group, the state power investment group) face the environment related risks and potential stranded risk carried out in-depthCase studies.We looked at the financial structure and market value of Chinese power generation companies historically.This helps determine the performance, stability, and asset health of the sample company, as well as its ability to raise funds in the future, as investors seek such information to identify investmentsThe expected rate of return of capital.Faced with the various risk factors revealed in this report, the stranded assets generated by the financially sound power companies are also more accommodatingEasy to adapt.If the sample company is under heavy financial pressure, investors will consider the company to be an industry non-investment grade and whether to invest in it or notBe hesitant to invest, or demand a higher return on your investment.In promoting low-carbon investment in China, capital entry is crucial.We found that the financial situation of the top 50 Chinese coal and power companies generally deteriorated.First, between 2008 and 2015, the industry capitalThe loss reached 13.8 billion yuan.Second, Chinese power companies are highly dependent on short-term debt (current liabilities) if the marketThe situation deteriorates rapidly, which may lead to additional financial risk and bankruptcy risk.Third, over the years, profit margins have continued to decline since 1995That fell from 23% a year earlier to 9% in 2015.Fourth, sample companies have been trying to increase their financial leverage, resulting in higherFinancial risk.Fifth, Chinese coal-fired power companies typically have very low cash reserves, reducing their ability to use cash or cash equivalents to repay debtForce.Sixth, debt as a share of income is growing, extending the time it takes to repay debt.In order to measure the potential stranded scale of China's coal-fired power assets and the upper limit of this scale, we use four scenarios to illustrateIn each scenario, assume that all existing and planned new coal plants are completely grounded in 5, 10, 15, and 20 years, respectively.Considering the wholeThe rate of change in the global energy system, these scenarios are set over the right time span.As the tipping point approaches, the damage caused by stranded assetsIt seems to be accelerating, but the power sector's desire to keep new coal-fired power assets relatively static and "safe" runs counter to what we saw happening in the G20.These four scenarios reflect the speed and scale at which environment-related risks, as explained in this report, have a material impact.It is important to stress that these scenarios highlight the biggest potential impact of stranded assets on China's power sector and estimate the value of stranded assetsIt could be as high as 30,866-7,201 billion yuan ($449 - $1,047 billion), equivalent to 4.1% to 9.5% of China's GDP in 2015.In view of theAt this scale, financial regulators should carefully examine which parts of the Chinese financial system are more or less exposed to these risks and consider measures to mitigate them.Given rising overcapacity, competition from renewable sources, reductions in carbon emission quotas and declining demand for electricity, the failure to identify the risk of asset stranding-off for China's existing and approved coal-fired power plants could have serious consequences.Stranded assets will be affectedInvestors' expected returns hurt the plants' ability to repay their huge debts, and ultimately leave taxpayers and electricity users to absorb themAssets.

我們研究了中國排名前 50 的煤電集團(tuán)（合計裝機(jī)容量占全國煤電總裝機(jī)容量的 89%）旗下的現(xiàn)役 和計劃新建煤電所面臨的環(huán)境相關(guān)風(fēng)險。我們測算了每個電廠在 7 個區(qū)域?qū)用婧?12 個國家層面風(fēng)險假 設(shè)的暴露程度。這種資產(chǎn)層面的分析隨后會匯總到母公司層面，來幫助特定的投資者制定包括風(fēng)險管 理、風(fēng)險篩選、表決、參與和撤資在內(nèi)的投資決策。我們也針對中國五大發(fā)電集團(tuán)（華能國際，大唐集 團(tuán)，國電集團(tuán)，華電集團(tuán)，國家電力投資集團(tuán)）所面臨的環(huán)境相關(guān)風(fēng)險和潛在的擱淺風(fēng)險進(jìn)行了深入的 案例研究。 我們研究了中國各發(fā)電公司歷來的財務(wù)結(jié)構(gòu)和市場價值。這樣做有助于確定樣本公司的業(yè)績表現(xiàn)、 穩(wěn)定性和資產(chǎn)健康狀況，也為公司未來的融資能力提供了參考，同時投資者也在尋求此類信息以確定投 資的預(yù)期回報率。面對本報告所揭示的各種風(fēng)險因素產(chǎn)生的擱淺資產(chǎn)，財務(wù)狀況良好的電力企業(yè)也更容 易適應(yīng)。如果樣本公司背負(fù)著沉重的財務(wù)壓力，投資者將會認(rèn)為該公司屬于行業(yè)非投資級別并在是否投 資上猶豫不決，或者會要求更高的投資回報率。在促進(jìn)中國低碳轉(zhuǎn)型投資方面，資本的進(jìn)入至關(guān)重要。 我們發(fā)現(xiàn)排名前 50 的中國煤電企業(yè)的財務(wù)狀況普遍惡化。首先，2008 到 2015 年期間，該行業(yè)資 產(chǎn)虧損達(dá)到了 138 億人民幣。其次，中國電力企業(yè)對短期債務(wù)（流動負(fù)債）有很大的依賴性，如果市場 狀況迅速惡化，可能導(dǎo)致額外的財務(wù)風(fēng)險和破產(chǎn)風(fēng)險。第三，多年以來，利潤率在持續(xù)下降，從 1995 年的 23%降到了 2015 年的 9%。第四，樣本公司一直在努力增加他們的財務(wù)杠桿，從而導(dǎo)致了更高的 財務(wù)風(fēng)險。第五，中國煤電企業(yè)的現(xiàn)金儲備通常很低，削弱了他們使用現(xiàn)金或現(xiàn)金等價物償還債務(wù)的能 力。第六，債務(wù)占收入的比重越來越大，延長了償還債務(wù)的時間。 為了衡量中國煤電資產(chǎn)潛在的擱淺規(guī)模和這一規(guī)模的上限，我們使用了四個情景進(jìn)行說明，在這四 個情景中，假設(shè)所有現(xiàn)役和計劃新建煤電廠分別在 5 年、10 年、15 年和 20 年后被完全擱淺?？紤]到全 球能源系統(tǒng)的變化速度，這些情景設(shè)定的時間跨度非常合適。隨著臨界點(diǎn)的來臨，擱淺資產(chǎn)帶來的破壞 似乎正在加速，但電力部門意圖保持新建煤電資產(chǎn)的相對靜態(tài)和“安全”的想法，與我們看到的 20 國 集團(tuán)（G20）實際發(fā)生的情況是背道而馳的。 這四種情景反映了本報告所解釋的環(huán)境相關(guān)風(fēng)險產(chǎn)生實質(zhì)性作用的速度和規(guī)模。需要著重強(qiáng)調(diào)的 是，這些情景突出了煤電擱淺資產(chǎn)給中國電力部門造成的最大潛在影響，估計煤電擱淺資產(chǎn)的價值規(guī)模 可能高達(dá) 30,860–72,010 億元（4,490-10,470 億美元），相當(dāng)于 2015 年中國 GDP 的 4.1%–9.5%。鑒于 這樣的規(guī)模，金融監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)應(yīng)該審慎地考查中國金融系統(tǒng)中哪些部分或多或少地暴露在這些風(fēng)險下，并 考慮采取相關(guān)措施來減輕這種風(fēng)險。 鑒于產(chǎn)能日益過剩、可再生能源的競爭、碳排放配額的減少、電力需求的下滑，如不能及時發(fā)現(xiàn)中 國現(xiàn)役和已批準(zhǔn)新建的煤電廠所面臨的資產(chǎn)擱淺風(fēng)險，可能會造成嚴(yán)重的后果。煤電擱淺資產(chǎn)將會影響 投資者的預(yù)期收益，損害電廠償還巨額負(fù)債的能力，并最終會導(dǎo)致讓納稅人和電力用戶去消化這些擱淺 資產(chǎn)。