我的介紹。能源安全100周年!關(guān)于彈性能源系統(tǒng)的思考由Friedbert Pfluger1913年7月17日，也就是差不多整整100年前，海軍部的第一任大臣溫斯頓丘吉爾在英國(guó)下議院發(fā)言。他宣稱，英國(guó)軍艦將不再使用煤炭，而是改用煤炭為了比德國(guó)艦隊(duì)更快、更節(jié)省成本。然而，這也意味著皇家海軍必須用波斯石油代替國(guó)內(nèi)的煤炭。在反駁反對(duì)派的批評(píng)時(shí)，他堅(jiān)稱，倫敦永遠(yuǎn)不應(yīng)依賴于單一的國(guó)家、航線、能源或(石油)油田:“石油的安全與確定性在于多樣性，而多樣性是唯一的。”——丘吉爾因此概述了戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的中心主題未來(lái)所有關(guān)于能源安全的辯論能源供應(yīng)多樣化。 60年后的1973年10月，歐佩克的石油禁運(yùn)令西方震驚。忽視了丘吉爾的警告，工業(yè)化世界已經(jīng)有一段時(shí)間陷入對(duì)石油生產(chǎn)國(guó)的依賴，特別是來(lái)自中東的國(guó)家?，F(xiàn)在石油價(jià)格翻了兩番，經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩，一夜之間，世界的力量平衡發(fā)生了明顯的變化:生產(chǎn)者在全球“南方”已經(jīng)成為一個(gè)政治強(qiáng)國(guó)。第一次，“北方”在“石油武器”面前顯得不堪一擊。 在石油危機(jī)之后，能源安全成為西方工業(yè)化國(guó)家關(guān)注的核心問(wèn)題。在1974年的華盛頓能源會(huì)議上，他們同意在未來(lái)能源供應(yīng)中斷的情況下采取一致行動(dòng)。這就是所謂的戰(zhàn)略石油儲(chǔ)備以及國(guó)際能源機(jī)構(gòu)(IEA)的形成過(guò)程，IEA是作為制衡歐佩克帝國(guó)的機(jī)構(gòu)(丹尼爾耶金)?？偛课挥诎屠璧膰?guó)際能源機(jī)構(gòu)沒(méi)有辜負(fù)其創(chuàng)始人的期望。它對(duì)當(dāng)今能源政策發(fā)展的分析和預(yù)測(cè)構(gòu)成了科學(xué)、商業(yè)和政治的共同基礎(chǔ)。它還提出了現(xiàn)在被廣泛接受的能源安全的定義，即“以可承受的價(jià)格不斷獲得能源”。在全球化和數(shù)字化的世界里，能源的重要性只會(huì)繼續(xù)增加。今天，幾乎任何東西都離不開(kāi)能源，無(wú)論是飲用水、電視、電腦還是電話。如果沒(méi)有全球運(yùn)輸網(wǎng)絡(luò)、冷卻系統(tǒng)和商店，我們?yōu)槿藗兲峁┦澄锖捅匦杵返墓?yīng)鏈就會(huì)失靈。因此，不間斷的能源供應(yīng)變得更加重要。能源安全是對(duì)每個(gè)現(xiàn)代社會(huì)來(lái)說(shuō)，這都是生死攸關(guān)的問(wèn)題。在過(guò)去的十年里，可再生能源的出現(xiàn)——它們至少可以滿足全球2%的能源需求(不包括水力發(fā)電)——幾乎沒(méi)有削弱這種主導(dǎo)地位化石燃料。即使到2035年，大約80%的能源需求將由石油、天然氣和煤炭來(lái)滿足(順便說(shuō)一下，它們所占比例幾乎相等)(IEA《2012年世界能源展望》)。因此，在可預(yù)見(jiàn)的未來(lái)，國(guó)際能源安全將繼續(xù)依賴于不間斷的化石燃料供應(yīng)。以可承受的價(jià)格保障供應(yīng)是一個(gè)極其復(fù)雜和脆弱的問(wèn)題，因此持續(xù)面臨風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。在這種情況下，我們可以區(qū)分七個(gè)主要的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)因素:能源安全的七個(gè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)因素 1. 能源生產(chǎn)國(guó)的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)、危機(jī)和沖突可能導(dǎo)致影響全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的生產(chǎn)和能源供應(yīng)中斷。1979年的伊朗革命，1990/91年的第一次海灣戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)例如，2011年解放戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)導(dǎo)致利比亞石油生產(chǎn)完全停止，這一切都對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈、能源價(jià)格以及進(jìn)口國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)形勢(shì)產(chǎn)生了巨大影響。同樣，2002年烏戈?查韋斯(Hugo Chavez)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下的委內(nèi)瑞拉大罷工或2003年的伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)也產(chǎn)生了嚴(yán)重影響，并起到了推波助瀾的作用——此外還有其他一些因素，我們將在后面討論油價(jià)持續(xù)飆升，最終達(dá)到每桶140美元，加劇了全球經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)。2. 由于片面依賴能源生產(chǎn)國(guó)而造成的政治敲詐是以可承受的價(jià)格不間斷供應(yīng)能源的另一個(gè)危險(xiǎn)因素。俄羅斯對(duì)歐洲部分地區(qū)，尤其是中歐和東歐國(guó)家的天然氣供應(yīng)占據(jù)主導(dǎo)地位，這意味著天然氣價(jià)格不再由供需機(jī)制決定，而是由政治決定，取決于各自政府的良好表現(xiàn)。2005/06年和2009年俄羅斯對(duì)烏克蘭的天然氣供應(yīng)中斷，在幾個(gè)中歐國(guó)家引發(fā)了供應(yīng)危機(jī)，盡管其實(shí)際影響不及對(duì)俄羅斯大規(guī)模示威的擔(dān)憂。這兩起天然氣危機(jī)不應(yīng)由俄羅斯單方面承擔(dān)責(zé)任，它們引發(fā)了歐洲圍繞能源安全問(wèn)題的激烈討論，并為通過(guò)“南部走廊”從里海地區(qū)提供替代供應(yīng)、實(shí)現(xiàn)天然氣行業(yè)更多樣化的計(jì)劃提供了新的動(dòng)力。除此之外，他們還促成了一項(xiàng)真正的歐洲能源政策的出臺(tái)，并任命了一位合適的歐盟能源專員(岡瑟厄廷格)。3.迫在眉睫的重新國(guó)有化——甚至是能源帝國(guó)主義——如今是一個(gè)主要基于供需相互作用的全球供應(yīng)體系的真正威脅。超過(guò)80%的常規(guī)石油和天然氣儲(chǔ)備是由國(guó)有或半國(guó)有的能源公司生產(chǎn)的，即在美國(guó)，他們直接或間接地依賴于各自國(guó)家的政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，而這些領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人非常清楚他們所控制的資源的政治意義。到2035年，全球能源需求將增長(zhǎng)三分之一。在世界人口急劇增長(zhǎng)和能源需求旺盛的背景下，自然資源日益稀缺，這將使人們更有可能利用自己的財(cái)富來(lái)達(dá)到民族主義甚至帝國(guó)主義的目的。中國(guó)在全球范圍內(nèi)獲取能源和原材料的決心，是21世紀(jì)初最重要的現(xiàn)象之一。4. 恐怖分子襲擊能源基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。在石油和液化天然氣運(yùn)輸船的航線上，以及在管道和石油鉆井平臺(tái)上，也可能以可承受的成本對(duì)供應(yīng)安全構(gòu)成威脅。2006年，尼日利亞尼日爾三角洲的恐怖分子導(dǎo)致石油產(chǎn)量大幅下降。在穆巴拉克下臺(tái)后的一年里，埃及和以色列之間的阿里-阿什克倫管道遭到13次襲擊，給以色列的能源安全帶來(lái)了嚴(yán)重后果。以色列40%的物資依賴埃及;而鄰國(guó)約旦的這一數(shù)字是80%。就在2013年1月，伊斯蘭恐怖分子襲擊了英國(guó)石油公司(BP)在阿爾及利亞沙漠的石油生產(chǎn)，并綁架了該公司的員工。海峽周圍的任何地方——從馬六甲海峽到霍爾木茲海峽，再到也門和索馬里之間的曼德布海峽——恐怖分子和海盜潛伏著，經(jīng)常是相互勾結(jié)的。5.針對(duì)關(guān)鍵能源基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的網(wǎng)絡(luò)恐怖主義，對(duì)能源安全構(gòu)成了越來(lái)越大、往往被低估的危險(xiǎn)。Frank Umbach最近指出，盡管美國(guó)軍方被迫削減預(yù)算，但五角大樓的網(wǎng)絡(luò)司令部從900人增加到4900人。美國(guó)總統(tǒng)奧巴馬最近警告說(shuō)，美國(guó)的敵人可能試圖破壞美國(guó)的能源基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，特別是電網(wǎng)。美國(guó)國(guó)家情報(bào)局(US national intelligence service)局長(zhǎng)詹姆斯?克拉珀(James Clapper)補(bǔ)充稱，此類攻擊構(gòu)成了“最直接的威脅”?！叭绻W(wǎng)絡(luò)攻擊成功地破壞了核電站的冷卻系統(tǒng)會(huì)怎樣?”2012年，奧地利作家馬克埃爾斯伯格(Marc Elsberg)在FAZ/慕尼黑安全論壇(Forum FAZ/ Munich Security Conference)上發(fā)表了一部關(guān)于網(wǎng)絡(luò)恐怖主義對(duì)歐洲電力供應(yīng)的威脅的政治驚悚小說(shuō)。 6.自然災(zāi)害是供應(yīng)安全的真正威脅，正如2005年卡特里娜颶風(fēng)和麗塔颶風(fēng)所證明的那樣。這些風(fēng)暴摧毀了墨西哥灣約170個(gè)海上石油平臺(tái)。美國(guó)近三分之一的石油生產(chǎn)和煉油能力喪失，對(duì)全國(guó)各地的供應(yīng)造成了深遠(yuǎn)而持久的影響。更糟糕的是2011年3月11日日本地震和隨之而來(lái)的海嘯的后果:它們導(dǎo)致了成千上萬(wàn)人的死亡和福島第一核電站“超越設(shè)計(jì)基礎(chǔ)的事故”，給日本社會(huì)和經(jīng)濟(jì)帶來(lái)了巨大的后果。除了如此嚴(yán)重的災(zāi)難外，再保險(xiǎn)公司報(bào)告說(shuō)，毀滅性的洪水和風(fēng)暴的數(shù)量正在上升——這不僅僅是氣候變化造成的后果。像這樣的自然災(zāi)害通常伴隨著短期或長(zhǎng)期的能源供應(yīng)中斷。這些威脅將隨著氣候變化的加劇而加劇:2012年10月的颶風(fēng)桑迪僅在紐約就奪去了6條生命，迫使37.5萬(wàn)人疏散，800萬(wàn)人斷電數(shù)日，這僅僅是一個(gè)前奏。就在幾年前，這么大的風(fēng)暴出現(xiàn)在遙遠(yuǎn)的北方還是不可想象的。氣候變化也給世界其他地區(qū)帶來(lái)了新的危險(xiǎn)，對(duì)人類和能源供應(yīng)都是如此:例如，當(dāng)西伯利亞的永久凍土帶永遠(yuǎn)變暖時(shí)，對(duì)俄羅斯意味著什么?當(dāng)喜馬拉雅冰川繼續(xù)融化，大型水電站不再生產(chǎn)足夠的電力時(shí)，對(duì)中國(guó)城市的供應(yīng)將會(huì)有什么后果?

I. Introduction

Energy Security Turns 100!

Thoughts on resilient energy systems

By Friedbert Pflger

On July 17, 1913, almost exactly 100 years ago, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, took the floor of the British House  of Commons. British warships, he proclaimed, would no longer be powered by coal, but by

oil instead in order to become faster and more cost-efficient than the German fleet. This, however, also meant that the Royal Navy had to substitute domestic coal with Persian oil.

Countering the critics in the opposition, he insisted that London should never become dependent on a single country, route, energy source or (oil)  field: “Safety and certainty in  oil lie in variety, and variety alone.” – Churchill had thereby outlined the central theme for

all future debates on energy security: the

diversification of energy supplies.

Sixty years later, in October 1973, OPEC’s oil embargo shocked the West. Neglecting Churchill’s warning, the industrialized world had, for some time already, fallen into dependence on oil-producing countries, particularly from the Middle East. Now oil

prices quadrupled, the economy slowed down and overnight it became clear that the world’s power balance had shifted: the producers

in the global “South” had become a political power. For the first time, the “North” appeared vulnerable to the “oil weapon”.

In the wake of the Oil Crisis, energy security became the core concern for the industrialized Western nations. At the 1974 Washington Energy Conference, they agreed on a concerted reaction in the event of future disruptions of energy supplies. This is how, among other things, the so-called strategic oil reserves came about, as well as the International Energy Agency (IEA), which was set up as an institutional counterweight to the OPEC-empire (Daniel Yergin). The IEA, based in Paris, lived up to its founders’ expectations. Its analyses and forecasts of developments in energy policy today form a common base for science, business and politics alike. It also put forth the now widely accepted definition  of energy security as “an uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price.”

The importance of energy has only continued to increase in a globalized and digitalized world. Today, hardly anything is conceivable anymore without energy, be it drinking  water, television, computers, or phones.

In the absence of the global network of transportation, cooling systems and stores, our supply chains providing people with food and essential goods would fail. Therefore, the uninterrupted supply of energy has become  all the more important. Energy security is

a matter of life or death for every modern society. The advent of renewable forms of energy in the last decade – they can at least cover about two percent of the global energy demand (excluding hydro-power) – has barely done anything to diminish the dominance

of fossil fuels. Even by 2035, around eighty percent of the energy demand will be satisfied by oil, natural gas and coal (in almost equal shares, by the way) (IEA World Energy  Outlook 2012).

Energy security in the international context will therefore continue to depend on uninterrupted supplies of fossil fuels for the foreseeable future.

              Supply security at an affordable price is an extremely complex and fragile matter, and hence continuously at risk. In this context, we can distinguish seven central risk factors:

SEVEN RISK FACTORS FOR ENERGY SECURITY

1. Wars, crises and conflict in energy- producing countries can lead to disruptions of production and supply of energy that affect the global economy. The Iranian Revolution  of 1979, the First Gulf War of 1990/91 or the

complete halt of the Libyan oil production as a consequence of the war of liberation of 2011, for example, all had drastic effects on supply chains, energy prices and, as a consequence, the economic situation in importing countries. Similarly, the general strike in Hugo Chavez’ Venezuela of 2002 or the Iraq War of 2003 had serious effects and contributed – alongside other factors that will be discussed later –

to a continued surge of the oil price, which eventually hit $140 per barrel, exacerbating the global economic crisis.

2. Political extortion as a consequence of a one-sided dependence on an energy producer is another risk factor for an uninterrupted supply of energy at an affordable price. The dominance of Russian gas supplies to parts of Europe, in particular the Central and Eastern European countries, meant that gas prices were no longer determined via supply and demand mechanisms, but decided politically, depending on good conduct by the respective government. The disruptions of Russian gas supplies to the Ukraine of 2005/06 and 2009 caused a supply crisis in several Central European countries, even though its actual effect was outmatched by the fears of a massive demonstration of power by Russia.

The two gas crises, which Moscow should not be blamed for one-sidedly, sparked an intensification of European discussions over energy security and gave new impetus to plans for more diversification of the gas sector through alternative supplies from the Caspian region via the “Southern Corridor”. In addition to that, they led to the inception of a genuine European energy policy and the appointment of a proper EU-Commissioner for energy (Gnther Oettinger).

3. An impending re-nationalization – and even energy imperialism – today are real threats  for a global supply system based primarily on the interplay of supply and demand. More than eighty percent of conventional reserves  of oil and natural gas are produced by state-  or semi-state-owned energy companies, i.e., they are directly or indirectly dependent on  the political leaders of that respective country, who are well aware of the political relevance of the resources they control. Increasing scarcity of natural resources against the backdrop of a dramatic growth of the world’s population and its thirst for energy – global demand will increase by one third by 2035 –will make it  all the more tempting to use one’s riches for nationalist, or even imperialist, ends. China’s determination in securing access to sources  of energy and raw materials across the entire globe ranks among the most significant phenomena of the early twenty-first century.

4. Terrorist attacks against energy infrastructure, i.e., on the routes of oil and LNG tankers as well as on pipelines and oil rigs, can also pose a threat to supply security at an affordable cost. In 2006, terrorists in  the Niger-Delta (in Nigeria) caused a dramatic reduction in oil production. The Arish-Ashkelon pipeline between Egypt and Israel was  attacked 13 times in the year following the fall of Mubarak, with dramatic consequences for Israel’s energy security. Forty percent of Israel’s supplies depend on Egypt; for neighbouring Jordan that figure is eighty percent. As recent as January 2013, Islamist terrorists attacked BP’s oil production in the Algerian desert and kidnapped employees of that company. Anywhere around straits – from the Strait of Malacca to the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab-el-Mandeb between Yemen and Somalia – terrorists and pirates lurk, often in collaboration.

5.Cyber terrorism against critical energy infrastructure represents a growing and often underestimated danger to energy security. Frank Umbach recently pointed out that, although the US-military is forced to make cuts in their budget, the Pentagon’s Cyber Command was increased from 900 to 4 900 personnel. President Barack Obama recently warned that enemies of the United States could attempt to sabotage its  energy infrastructure, particularly its power grids. The head of the US national intelligence service, James Clapper, added that such attacks constituted “the most  immediate  threat.” What if a cyber attack succeeded in disabling the cooling systems of nuclear power plants? In 2012, Austrian author Marc Elsberg wrote a political thriller on the dangers of cyber terrorism for Europe’s electricity supply that he recently presented at the Forum FAZ/ Munich Security Conference.

6.Natural disasters are a real threat to supply security, as the two storms Katrina and Rita demonstrated in 2005. These  storms destroyed about 170 offshore oil platforms in the Gulf of Mexico. Almost a third of the American oil production and its refining capacity was lost – with far-reaching and long-lasting consequences for supplies across the entire country. Even worse were the consequences of the earthquake and the ensuing tsunami on March 11, 2011 in Japan: they led to the death of thousands of people and a “beyond design-basis accident” at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, with dramatic consequences for Japan’s society and economy. Beyond disasters of such magnitude, reinsurance companies report that the number of devastating floods and storms  is on the rise – not least as a consequence of climate change. And natural disasters like these are usually accompanied by short- or long-term disruptions of energy supplies. These threats will increase along with the progression of climate change: monster storm Sandy of October 2012, which took six lives in New York alone, forced the evacuation of 375 000 people, and left 8 million people without electricity for several days, was only a foretaste. Only a few years ago, it was inconceivable that storms of this magnitude would appear as far north. Climate change also brings new dangers to other parts of the world, both, for people and energy supplies: What, for example, will it mean for Russia when the permafrost regions of Siberia get perpetually warmer? What consequences will there be for supplies to Chinese cities when Himalayan glaciers continue to melt and the big hydro-power plants do not pro- duce enough electricity any longer?